Abstract. For the authentication model with arbitration (A 2 -code), Johansson showed a lower bound on the size of encoding rules. However, this bound is no longer tight if the size of source states is large. This paper presents a more tight lower bound on the size of encoding rules for large source states. An A 2 -code is shown which approximately meets the proposed bound, also. Further, we show that the size of encoding rules for the transmitter can be greatly reduced if the receiver's cheating probability is slightly large.
Introduction
As in 8], A 2 -code is described as follows. In the model for normal authentication (A-code), the transmitter and the receiver are using the same encoding rule and are thus trusting each other 1] 5]. However, it is no always the case that the two communicating parties want to trust each other. Inspired by this problem Simmons has introduced an extended authentication model 6, 7] , here referred to as the authentication model with arbitration (A 2 -code). In this model caution is taken against deception from both outsiders (opponent) and insiders (transmitter and receiver). The model includes a fourth person, called the arbiter. The arbiter has access to all key information and is by de nition not cheating. The arbiter does not take part in any communication activities on the channel but has to solve disputes between the transmitter and the receiver whenever such occur.
There are essentially ve di erent kinds of attacks to cheat which are possible. The attacks are the following: I, Impersonation by the opponent. The opponent sends a massage to the receiver and succeeds if the message is accepted by the receiver as authentic.
S, Substitution by the opponent. The opponent observes a message that is transmitted and substitutes this message with another. The opponent succeeds if this other message is accepted by the receiver as authentic.
T, Impersonation by the transmitter. The transmitter sends a message to the receiver and denies having sent it. The transmitter succeeds if the message is accepted by the receiver as authentic and if the message is not one of the messages that the transmitter could have generated due to his encoding rule. R0, Impersonation by the receiver. The receiver claims to have received a message from the transmitter. The receiver succeeds if the message could have been generated by the transmitter due to his encoding rule. R1, Substitution by the receiver. The receiver receives a message from the transmitter but claims to have received another message. The receiver succeeds if this other message could have been generated by the transmitter due to his encoding rule. For each way of cheating, we denote the probability of success with P I ; P S ; P T ; P R0 and P R1 .
Let E R be a set of the receiver's encoding rules and E T be a set of the transmitter's encoding rules. Also, let S be a set of source states. Recently, Johansson showed 8] a lower bound on jE T j and jE R j to achieve max(P I ; P S ; P T ; P R0 ; P R1 ) = 1=q. This bound is tight for jSj q because he also showed an A 2 -code which meets the bound 9]. However, this bound is no longer tight if jSj > q + 1.
On the other hand, it is known that, in A-code, the size of encoding rules is greatly reduced if P S is slightly greater than its lower bound 11, 12, 13] We denote by x j the j-th column vector of X. y j denotes the j-th column vector of Y , etc.
{ For a vector y, de ne w(y) 4 = the number of nonzero elements of y. We say that w(y) is the weight of y.
{ For x i = (x 1i ; x 2i ; ) T and x j = (x 1j ; x 2j ; ) T , de ne x i x j = (x 1i x 1j ; x 2i x 2j ; ) T .
Authentication code ( A-code )
In the normal model for authentication, there are three participants, a transmitter T, a receiver R and an opponent O. An authentication code (A-code) is (S,E,M) such that S = fsg is a set of source states, E = feg is a set of rules and M = fmg is a set of messages. T and R share e secretly. On input s, T sends m such that m = e(s) to R. R accepts or rejects m based on e.
There are two kinds of attacks of the opponent O, the impersonation attack and the substitution attack. They are de ned in the same way as described in Introduction. The impersonation attack probability P I is de ned by P I 
Basic results on A-code
The following observation is a basis for the bound on P I and P S . (1) max j w(x j )=b k=v. ( 2) The equality holds if and only if w(x j ) = kb=v for 8j and w(g i ) = k for 8i.
Proof. Denote by N the total number of 1s in X. Then, N kb. Therefore, there exists x j such that w(x j )=b N=v kb=v. (2) is clear from the above discussion.
u t De nition 9. Let I l (h) 4 = fij(h ? 1)l + 1 i hlg. We say that a b kl binary matrix X = fx ij g is a (b; k; l; n 0 ; n 1 ) K-array if the following conditions are satis ed.
(1) w(x i ) = n 0 for 8i. However, if some dispute happens between T and R, the arbiter does not accept m j as authentic. This attack should also be considered as a substitution attack of the opponent. We call this attack the second type substitution attack of the opponent.
Proof
Let X = fx ij g be the skeleton matrix for (E R ; M) (see Def.3). We will show that X is a (jE R j; qjSj; q; jE R j=q; jE R j=q 2 ) K-array (see Def.9). Let Proof. Consider a A-code (S; M fi ; E T (f i )) in which the arbiter is a receiver and the receiver is an opponent. Let Y = fy ij g be the skeleton matrix for (E T (f i ); M fi ). Each row vector of Y has a constant weight jSj because 8e j generates one message for each s (no splitting). Then, from lemma 8, 1=q = P R0 = max j w(y j )=jE T (f i )j jSj=jM fi j (1) Therefore, jM fi j qjSj. Now, we have shown that the weight of each row vector of X is at least qjSj. Then, from lemma 8 and (C2), 1=q = P I = max j w(x j )=jE R j qjSj=jMj = 1=q
This means that max j w(x j )=jE R j = qjSj=jMj. Then, again from lemma 8, we have w(x j ) = jE R j=q for 8j; and jM fi j = qjSj for 8i
Then, we see that the equality of eq. (1) is also satis ed. That is, 1=q = P R1 = P R0 = jSj=jM fi j Now, from lemma 10 and 11, we have (2) of this lemma. Finally, we will prove (4). Let W = fw ij g be the skeleton matrix for (E T (f i ); M fi (s)). The weight of each row vector of W is 1 from the second sentence of this proof. Then, from lemma 8, we have 1=q = P R0 = max j w(w j )=jE T (f i )j 1=jM fi (s)j Therefore, jM fi (s)j q. On the other hand, qjSj = jM fi j = P s jM fi (s)j qjSj. Hence, we must have jM fi (s)j = q. u t
From lemma 14, we see that X satis es the condition (1) Theorem 18. In the above scheme, P I = P S = P R0 = P R1 = P T = 1=q; and jE R j = q 2 jSj; jE T E R j = q 3 jSj 2 ; jE T j = q 2 jSj 2 (A 2 -code )
In A 2 -code , e i 2 E T is e i = (e i1 ; e i2 ; ; e i;n+2 ; e i;2n+2 ), where 8e ij 2 GF(q). This code is obtained from A 2 -code by letting e i;n+3 = e 2 i;n+2 ; ; e i;2n+1 = e n i;n+2
Theorem 19. In the above scheme, P I = P S = P R0 = P T = 1=q; P R1 n=q and jE R j = q 2 jSj; jE T E R j = q 4 jSj; jE T j = q 3 jSj 6 Further work
Relationships with error correcting codes and orthogonal arrays will be discussed in the nal paper.
